Information Asymmetries and Consumption Decisions in Organic Food Product Markets

Organic agriculture is a rapidly growing segment of most developed agricultural economies around the world. To stimulate growth and circumvent supply-side market failures that emerge when organic products are not segregated, governments have introduced regulations concerning the certification and labeling of organic food. While certification and labeling satisfy market demand for information provision, the introduction of these activities creates incentives for the mislabeling of conventional food as organic. Despite the incentives for, and the incidence of, mislabeling in organic food product markets, this issue has not been analyzed systematically. In fact, the possibility of mislabeling has been customarily neglected by economic studies of markets for credence goods in general. This paper addresses the issue of product type misrepresentation in organic food product markets and develops a model of heterogeneous consumers that examines the effect of mislabeling on consumer purchasing decisions and welfare. Analytical results show that, contrary to what is traditionally believed, while certification and labeling are necessary, they are not sufficient for alleviating failures in organic food product markets. The effectiveness of labeling depends on the level of product type misrepresentation. Consumer deception through mislabeling affects consumer trust in the labeling process and can have detrimental consequences for the market acceptance of organic products. When extensive mislabeling occurs, the value of labeling is undermined and the organic food market fails. L'agriculture biologique est un secteur qui prend rapidement de l'expansion dans la plupart des pays agricoles industrialises. Pour stimuler la croissance de ce secteur et eviter les problemes d'offre qui surviennent quand il n'y a pas segregation des denrees, les gouvernements ont adopte des reglements sur la certification et l'etiquetage des produits biologiques. Meme s'ils satisfont la demande d'informations sur le marche, la certification et l'etiquetage ouvrent la porte a l'usage abusif du terme “biologique” sur l'etiquette des denrees ordinaires. Or, bien que les producteurs soient tentes d'utiliser le terme a tort et a travers et en depit des incidences d'un tel comportement, le phenomene n'a jamais ete analyse de maniere methodique. De fait, les analyses economiques sur le marche des denrees alimentaires, en general, negligent souvent la possibilite de fausses declarations sur l'etiquette des produits. L'article que voici aborde ce probleme sur le marche des aliments biologiques et propose un modele qui tient compte des effets d'un etiquetage fallacieux sur les achats et le bien-etre de consommateurs heterogenes. Les resultats de l'analyse indiquent que, contrairement a ce qu'on croit, la certification et l'etiquetage, bien que necessaires, ne suffisent pas a attenuer les problemes observes sur le marche des aliments biologiques. En effet, l'efficacite de l'etiquetage depend du nombre de fausses declarations. La deception qui resulte d'une fausse declaration ebranle la confiance des consommateurs dans le systeme d'etiquetage, si bien que les produits biologiques sont mal accueillis sur le marche. Quand les fausses declarations se multiplient, l'etiquette perd sa valeur et il devient impossible de commercialiser les denrees biologiques.

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