Perception, Introspection and Functional Consonance

: What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a conforming belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be red to oneself- rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be green to oneself instead. I offer some non-Cartesian, functionalist reasons supporting such an introspective certainty view, based on a concept of logical consonance of perceptual dispositions, according to which both experience-based and belief dispositions cannot diverge in their content, on pain of their having inconsistent manifestations in relevant situations, such as color-sorting tasks. In addition, other views of introspection are criticized from the perspective of this consonance view.