An economist's perspective on multi-agent learning
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Peter Secretan. Learning , 1965, Mental Health.
[2] L. Samuelson,et al. Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games , 1992 .
[3] David M. Kreps,et al. Learning Mixed Equilibria , 1993 .
[4] E. Kalai,et al. Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium , 1993 .
[5] M. Hirsch,et al. Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games , 1999 .
[6] P. S. Ward. ANTS , 1889, Science.
[7] Glenn Ellison,et al. Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning , 1995 .
[8] M. Cripps,et al. Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits , 2003 .
[9] Dov Samet,et al. Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation , 2001, J. Econ. Theory.
[10] D. Fudenberg. Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics , 2006 .
[11] Timothy C. Salmon. An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning , 2001 .
[12] K. Schlag. Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits , 1998 .
[13] Glenn Ellison. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching , 1994 .
[14] Pradeep Dubey,et al. Learning with perfect information , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..
[15] Colin Camerer,et al. Experience‐weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games , 1999 .
[16] L. Samuelson,et al. Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata , 1992 .
[17] Tilman Börgers,et al. Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspiration , 1998 .
[18] E. Hopkins. Learning, Matching and Aggregation , 1995 .
[19] Alan Kirman,et al. Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment , 1993 .
[20] J. Weibull,et al. Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation , 1994 .
[21] D. Fudenberg,et al. Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium , 1993 .
[22] Tilman Börgers,et al. Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations , 2000 .
[23] Mark Perlman,et al. The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour , 1996 .
[24] Glenn Ellison,et al. Rules of Thumb for Social Learning , 1993, Journal of Political Economy.