Physician manipulation of reimbursement rules for patients: between a rock and a hard place.

CONTEXT Health plan utilization review rules are intended to enforce insurance contracts and can alter and constrain the services that physicians provide to their patients. Physicians can manipulate these rules, but how often they do so is unknown. OBJECTIVE To determine the frequency with which physicians manipulate reimbursement rules to obtain coverage for services they perceive as necessary, and the physician attitudes and personal and practice characteristics associated with these manipulations. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS A random national sample of 1124 practicing physicians was surveyed by mail in 1998; the response rate was 64% (n = 720). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE Use of 3 different tactics "sometimes" or more often in the last year: (1) exaggerating the severity of patients' conditions; (2) changing patients' billing diagnoses; and/or (3) reporting signs or symptoms that patients did not have to help the patients secure coverage for needed care. RESULTS Thirty-nine percent of physicians reported using at least 1 tactic "sometimes" or more often in the last year. In multivariate models comparing these physicians with physicians who "never" or "rarely" used any of these tactics, physicians using these tactics were more likely to (1) believe that "gaming the system" is necessary to provide high-quality care today (odds ratio [OR], 3.67; 95% confidence interval [CI], 2.54-5.29); (2) have received requests from patients to deceive insurers (OR, 2.44; 95% CI, 1.72-3.45); (3) feel pressed for time during patient visits (OR, 1.69; 95% CI, 1.21-2.37); and (4) have more than 25% of their patients covered by Medicaid (OR, 1.60; 95% CI, 1.08-2.38). Notably, greater worry about prosecution for fraud did not affect physicians' use of these tactics (P = .34). Of those reporting using these tactics, 54% reported doing so more often now than 5 years ago. CONCLUSIONS A sizable minority of physicians report manipulating reimbursement rules so patients can receive care that physicians perceive is necessary. Unless novel strategies are developed to address this, greater utilization restrictions in the health care system are likely to increase physicians' use of such manipulative "covert advocacy" tactics.

[1]  G. Klerman,et al.  Models For Ethical Medicine In A Revolutionary Age / 298 , 2002 .

[2]  D. Greenhalgh ETHICS FORUM. , 2001, The Journal of burn care & rehabilitation.

[3]  K. Weinfurt,et al.  Lying for patients: physician deception of third-party payers. , 1999, Archives of internal medicine.

[4]  C Havighurst How physician organizations are responding to managed care. , 1999, Issue brief.

[5]  Thomas Pasko,et al.  Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the Us: 1999 , 1998 .

[6]  David S Hilzenrath Healing vs. honesty? For doctors, managed care's cost controls pose moral dilemma. , 1998, The Washington post.

[7]  E. Rich Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the U.S. 1997/98 , 1998, Annals of Internal Medicine.

[8]  P Slovic,et al.  Informing consumer decisions in health care: implications from decision-making research. , 1997, The Milbank quarterly.

[9]  B. Vickrey,et al.  Attitudes of US neurologists concerning the ethical dimensions of managed care , 1997, Neurology.

[10]  J P Mullooly,et al.  Physician-patient communication. The relationship with malpractice claims among primary care physicians and surgeons. , 1997, JAMA.

[11]  B H Gray,et al.  Medical professionalism under managed care: the pros and cons of utilization review. , 1997, Health affairs.

[12]  Malcolm K. Sparrow,et al.  License to Steal: Why Fraud Plagues America's HealthCare System , 1997 .

[13]  Barbara Gandek,et al.  Characteristics of Physicians with Participatory Decision-Making Styles , 1996, Annals of Internal Medicine.

[14]  K. Rost,et al.  The deliberate misdiagnosis of major depression in primary care. , 1994, Archives of family medicine.

[15]  R. C. Hall Legal precedents affecting managed care. The physician's responsibilities to patients. , 1994, Psychosomatics.

[16]  Cain Jm IS DECEPTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY JUSTIFIED , 1993 .

[17]  J. Nemes The fight against fraud. As the number of healthcare cases climbs, investigators make comparisons to S&L scandal. , 1993, Modern healthcare.

[18]  D. Burda Providers' share of fraud cases rises--survey. , 1993, Modern healthcare.

[19]  J. Cain Is deception for reimbursement in obstetrics and gynecology justified? , 1993, Obstetrics and gynecology.

[20]  E. Morreim Balancing Act: The New Medical Ethics of Medicine's New Economics , 1991 .

[21]  E. Morreim,et al.  Gaming the system. Dodging the rules, ruling the dodgers. , 1991, Archives of internal medicine.

[22]  G. W. Grumet Health care rationing through inconvenience. , 1990, The New England journal of medicine.

[23]  G. W. Grumet Health care rationing through inconvenience. The third party's secret weapon. , 1989, The New England journal of medicine.

[24]  L. Forrow,et al.  Physicians' attitudes toward using deception to resolve difficult ethical problems. , 1989, JAMA.

[25]  J. Samet,et al.  Doctors' decisions and the cost of medical care: By John M. Eisenberg. Health Administration Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1986. 190 pp. No price given , 1987 .

[26]  J. Eisenberg Doctors''Decisions and the Cost of Medical Care , 1986 .

[27]  A. Petersen,et al.  Consumerism in health care. , 1976, The Investor-owned hospital review.