Punchscan: Designing an independent verification mechanism for elections

Punchscan is an open-source vote-counting system, the results of which are independently veri able by voters through their participation in the election audit process. Voluntary and universally available, this audit process establishes an overwhelmingly high statistical degree of con dence in the integrity of the outcome. At the same time it was developed around the recognition that the secret-ballot, and in turn voter privacy, remain a fundamental requirement in modern democracies. Punchscan o ers voters the ability to see their vote count, while at the same time protecting against improper in uence. This thesis describes the design and development of Punchscan from an information security and system design perspective. It begins by examining the concerns over contemporary electronic vote-counting systems, and introduces principles (such as independent veri cation) from which a more secure system can be built. We go on to explore the functional components, their design purpose, and the election/veri cation procedures of Punchscan. We present a case study of Punchscan's rst use in a binding election. Finally we end with a discussion of how Punchscan met its design goals, and propose directions for future work.

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