Knowledge judgements and cognitive psychology

Separately, and in quite different ways, Mikkel Gerken and Jennifer Nagel have attempted to defend moderate classical invariantism (MCI) by appealing to recent work in cognitive psychology. They claim that by understanding the psychological processing that underlies our knowledge judgements, we can reconcile their apparent shiftiness with traditional non-shifty epistemology. The aim of this paper is to show how and why these attempts to exploit work in cognitive psychology to defend MCI run aground.

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