论文信息 - The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections

The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections

Abstract A monotonicity paradox occurs when a voting system reacts in a perverse way to a change in individual opinions. The vulnerability of a voting system to monotonicity paradoxes is defined as the proportion of voting situations that can give rise to such paradoxes. In this paper we provide analytical representations of this vulnerability in the three-alternative case for two voting systems, i.e. plurality with run-off (f1) and anti-plurality with run-off (f2). Our results suggest that the vulnerability to monotonicity paradoxes is lower with f1 than with f2.

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