False Data Injection Attack Based on Hyperplane Migration of Support Vector Machine in Transmission Network of the Smart Grid

The smart grid is a key piece of infrastructure and its security has attracted widespread attention. The false data injection (FDI) attack is one of the important research issues in the field of smart grid security. Because this kind of attack has a great impact on the safe and stable operation of the smart grid, many effective detection methods have been proposed, such as an FDI detector based on the support vector machine (SVM). In this paper, we first analyze the problem existing in the detector based on SVM. Then, we propose a new attack method to reduce the detection effect of the FDI detector based on SVM and give a proof. The core of the method is that the FDI detector based on SVM cannot detect the attack vectors which are specially constructed and can replace the attack vectors into the training set when it is updated. Therefore, the training set is changed and then the next training result will be affected. With the increase of the number of the attack vectors which are injected into the positive space, the hyperplane moves to the side of the negative space, and the detection effect of the FDI detector based on SVM is reduced. Finally, we analyze the impact of different data injection modes for training results. Simulation experiments show that this attack method can impact the effectiveness of the FDI detector based on SVM.

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