Neo-Institutional Economics and Planning Theory

In an institutional sense, planning theory is basically one dealing with the goals and form of and the procedure and justification for the regulation of the land market. Traditionally, welfare economics, a branch of mainstream economics fostered by Arthur C. Pigou, was the most persuasive ideological foundation for such regulation. The concepts of this branch of economics are often expressed in planning terms in the applied field of regional and urban economics, commonly taught in planning schools. However, what we may call ‘neo-institutional economics’ has begun to exert its impact on planning theory. This is evidenced by the appearance in the planning literature of a wave of works informed by a cluster of concepts in this branch of economics at the turn of the millennium by Alexander (1992, 2001a, 2001b, 2002), Benchetrit and Czamanski (2004), Booth (2002), Buitelaar (2003, 2004), Dawkins (2000), Gleeson and Low (2000), Lai (1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2004), Lai and Chan (2004), Lai and Ho (2003), Lai and Lorne (2003), Lai and Yu (2001), Micelli (2002), Pennington (1997, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2004), Poulton (1997), Sager (2001, 2002), Staley (2001), Webster (1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 2001a, 2001b, 2003), Webster and Wu (1999a, 1999b, 2001), and Webster and

[1]  M. Friedman.  Why Government Is the Problem , 1993 .

[2]  Samuel R. Staley.  Ballot-Box Zoning, Transaction Costs, and Urban Growth , 2001 .

[3]  Bernard H. Siegan.  Property Rights: From Magna Carta to the Fourteenth Amendment , 2001 .

[4]  Douglass C. North,et al.  A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics , 1990 .

[5]  M. Poulton.  Externalities, transaction costs, public choice and the appeal of zoning: a response to Lai Wai Chung and Sorensen , 1997 .

[6]  Steven Cheung.  THE TRANSACTION COSTS PARADIGM 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION , 1998 .

[7]  M. Olson,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups , 1969 .

[8]  M. Pennington.  Hayekian Political Economy and the Limits of Deliberative Democracy , 2003 .

[9]  M. Pennington.  Free market environmentalism and the limits of land use planning , 1999 .

[10]  L. Lai.  Libertarians on the Road to Town Planning: A Note on the Views of Robert Mundell, Karl Popper, Friedrich Hayek, Robert Nozick, Milton Friedman and Ronald Coase towards Pollution , 2002 .

[11]  Chris Webster,et al.  Regulation, Land-Use Mix, and Urban Performance. Part 1: Theory , 1999 .

[12]  M. Pennington.  Public Choice Theory and the Politics of Urban Containment: Voter-Centred versus Special-Interest Explanations , 2000 .

[13]  Y. Barzel.  A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State , 2001 .

[14]  Bernard H. Siegan.  Non-Zoning in Houston , 1970, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[15]  Brendan Gleeson,et al.  Revaluing planning: Rolling back neo-liberalism in Australia , 2000 .

[16]  Robert H. Nelson,et al.  Zoning and property rights: An analysis of the American system of land-use regulation , 1977 .

[17]  Joan V. Robinson,et al.  The Nature of the Firm , 2004 .

[18]  M. Pennington.  Environmental Markets vs. Environmental Deliberation: A Hayekian Critique of Green Political Economy , 2001 .

[19]  Is Zoning a Negative-Sum Game? , 1989 .

[20]  J. Stiglitz,et al.  Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information , 1981 .

[21]  Mancur Olson,et al.  The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. , 1983 .

[22]  W. Fischel,et al.  The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights Approach to American Land Use Controls , 1985 .

[23]  W. Fischel.  A Property Rights Approach to Municipal Zoning , 1978 .

[24]  Edwin Buitelaar,et al.  A Transaction-cost Analysis of the Land Development Process , 2004 .

[25]  P. Booth.  From property rights to public control: The quest for public interest in the control of urban development , 2002 .

[26]  H. Demsetz,et al.  The Property Right Paradigm , 1973, The Journal of Economic History.

[27]  Casey J. Dawkins.  Transaction Costs and the Land Use Planning Process , 2000 .

[28]  C. Webster.  The Donald Robertson Memorial Prizewinner 2003 The Nature of the Neighbourhood , 2003 .

[29]  Joseph E. Stiglitz,et al.  Credit Rationing: Reply , 1987 .

[30]  Lawrence Lai,et al.  FREE TO CHOOSE , 2000 .

[31]  L. Lai.  IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT : INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES , 2022 .

[32]  Chris Webster,et al.  Public Choice, Pigouvian and Coasian Planning Theory , 1998 .

[33]  Lwc Lai,et al.  Zoning and Property Rights: A Hong Kong Case Study , 1996 .

[34]  R. Coase.  The Nature of the Firm , 1937 .

[35]  T. Cowen,et al.  Market Failure or Success: The New Debate , 2003 .

[36]  Chris Webster,et al.  Coase, Spatial Pricing and Self -organising Cities , 2001 .

[37]  E. R. Alexander,et al.  A transaction-cost theory of land use planning and development control: Towards the institutional analysis of public planning , 2001 .

[38]  W. Fischel.  Zoning and the exercise of monopoly power: A reevaluation , 1980 .

[39]  C. Webster.  Gated cities of tomorrow , 2001 .

[40]  E. Alexander.  Planning Rights: Toward Normative Criteria for Evaluating Plans , 2002 .

[41]  John Othick,et al.  The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. , 1983 .

[42]  L. Lai.  The leasehold system as a means of planning by contract the case of Hong Kong , 1998 .

[43]  W. Fischel,et al.  Externalities and zoning , 1980 .

[44]  Sidney C. Sufrin,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. , 1966 .

[45]  F. Foldvary.  Dictionary of Free-Market Economics , 1998 .

[46]  H. Demsetz,et al.  Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization , 1975, IEEE Engineering Management Review.

[47]  Winky K.O. Ho,et al.  Modeling Developing Control of Residential Development: A Probit Analysis of Rent Seeking and Policy Autonomy in Town Planning in Hong Kong , 2003 .

[48]  LAND USE PLANNING: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICE? , 2003 .

[49]  Douglass C. North,et al.  The rise of the western world , 1976 .

[50]  G. Galster.  On the Nature of Neighbourhood , 2001 .

[51]  A. Kemp.  THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY , 1960 .

[52]  Tore Sager,et al.  Democratic Planning and Social Choice Dilemmas: Prelude to Institutional Planning Theory , 2002 .

[53]  C. Webster,et al.  Property Rights, Planning And Markets , 2003 .

[54]  L. Lai.  Planning and Property Rights in Hong Kong under Constitutional Capitalism , 2002 .

[55]  Edwin Buitelaar,et al.  Neither market nor government. Comparing the performance of user rights regimes , 2003 .

[56]  L. Lai.  Hayek and Town Planning: A Note on Hayek's Views towards Town Planning in The Constitution of Liberty , 1999 .

[57]  Shankha Chakraborty,et al.  Rent Seeking , 2005, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[58]  G. Benchetrit,et al.  The gradual abolition of the public leasehold system in Israel and Canberra: what lessons can be learned? , 2004 .

[59]  W. Dugger.  The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .

[60]  M. Pennington.  Budgets, Bureaucrats and the Containment of Urban England , 1997 .

[61]  P. Lawson,et al.  Federal Communications Commission , 2004, Bell Labs Technical Journal.

[62]  Ernest R. Alexander,et al.  A Transaction Cost Theory of Planning , 1992 .

[63]  L. Lai.  Spontaneous Catallaxis in Urban & Rural Development Under Planning by Contract in a Small Open Economy: The Ideas of Hayek and Mises at Work in Town & Country Planning in Hong Kong , 2004 .

[64]  Chris Webster.  Sustainability and Public Choice: A Theoretical Essay on Urban Performance Indicators , 1998 .

[65]  M. Ball.  Institutions in British Property Research: A Review , 1998 .

[66]  Lawrence W.C. Lai,et al.  The formation of owners’ corporations in Hong Kong’s private housing estates: A probit evaluation of Mancur Olson’s group theory , 2004 .

[67]  F. Hayek,et al.  Libertarians on the road to town planning , 2002 .

[68]  C. Webster.  Contractual agreements and neighbourhood evolution , 2001 .

[69]  E. G. Furubotn,et al.  Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics , 2005 .

[70]  Robert C. Ellickson.  Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls , 1973 .

[71]  T. Sager.  Positive Theory of Planning: The Social Choice Approach , 2001 .

[72]  L. Chung.  The economics of land-use zoning: a literature review and analysis of the work of Coase , 1994 .

[73]  D. North.  Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Economic performance , 1990 .

[74]  Ben T. Yu,et al.  Property rights and contractual approach to sustainable development , 1993 .

[75]  Marco K. W. Yu,et al.  The Rise and Fall of Discriminatory Zoning in Hong Kongt , 2001 .

[76]  J. Mcloughlin.  Centre or Periphery? Town Planning and Spatial Political Economy , 1994 .

[77]  Ezio Micelli,et al.  Development Rights Markets to Manage Urban Plans in Italy , 2002 .

[78]  M. Pennington.  Citizen Participation, the -Knowledge Problem- and Urban Land Use Planning: An Austrian Perspective on Institutional Choice , 2004 .

[79]  C. Webster.  Analytical public-choice planning theory: a response to Poulton , 1998 .

[80]  David de Meza,et al.  Economic Behaviour and Institutions. , 1992 .

[81]  L. Mises,et al.  Human Action: A Treatise on Economics , 1949 .