Getting Security Objectives Wrong: A Cautionary Tale of an Industrial Control System

We relate a story about an Industrial Control System in order to illustrate that simple security objectives can be deceptive: there are many things that can and do go wrong when deploying the system. Rather than trying to define security explicitly, this paper takes the position that one should consider the security of a system by comparing it against others whose security we consider to be acceptable: Alice is satisfied if her system is no less secure than Bob’s system.

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