论文信息 - On the Emergence of Social Norms

On the Emergence of Social Norms

We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We details the conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences, the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology of agent interaction.

Edward Cartwright | E. Cartwright

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