Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments
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Vincent Conitzer | Makoto Yokoo | Atsushi Iwasaki | Naoki Ohta | Yasufumi Satoh | M. Yokoo | Atsushi Iwasaki | Naoki Ohta | Vincent Conitzer | Yasufumi Satoh
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