A frame-theoretic analysis of two rival conceptions of heat

Under what circumstances, if any, are we warranted to assert that a theory is true or at least has some truth content? Scientific realists answer that such assertions are warranted only for those theories or theory-parts that enjoy explanatory and predictive success. A number of challenges to this answer have emerged, chief among them those arising from scientific theory change. For example, if, as scientific realists suggest, successive theories are to increasingly get closer to the truth, any theory changes must not undermine (i) the accumulation of explanatory and predictive success and (ii) the theoretical content responsible for that success. In this paper we employ frame theory to test to what extent certain theoretical claims made by the outdated caloric theory of heat and that, prima facie at least, were used to produce some of that theory’s success have survived into the theory that superseded it, i.e. the kinetic theory of heat. Our findings lend credence to structural realism, the view that scientific theories at best reveal only structural features of the unobservable world.

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