Evaluations of energy audits and the regulator

Abstract The empirical basis of this article is the energy audit evaluations carried out by AKF over the last decade. These evaluations were undertaken in a rather traditional manner as “assessment of the outcome of an intervention”, the aim being to answer the question: “How much energy was saved as a result of the audit, and what was the result from an economic viewpoint?” To a varying degree, information on the decision-making process within the audit schemes (e.g. control and sanctions) and the organisational context was also included. The present article briefly describes the evaluations, then analyses the resulting response by the energy authorities using three decision-making theories: the rational model for decisions, Wilson's dynamic model, and Stigler's agency capture model. It is demonstrated that these three models together explain the fate of the evaluated audit schemes, e.g. why loss-making schemes have been upheld or expanded.