Necessity, Possibility and Belief: A Study of Syllogistic Reasoning

The present study extended the investigation of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning in two ways: (1) The effect was studied under instructions to decide whether conclusions were possible, as well as necessary, given the premises; and (2) the effect was studied for types of syllogism where people rarely endorse the conclusions as well as those (valid and fallacious) where endorsements are common. Three experiments are reported, which show first that there is a marked tendency to reject unbelievable conclusions relative to abstract or neutral controls on all kinds of syllogism and under both types of instruction. There was also significant evidence of positive belief bias (increased acceptance of believable conclusions) and of interactions between belief bias effects and logical form. The results are discussed with particular respect to accounts of belief bias offered by theorists in the mental-model tradition.

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