Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games

[1]  P. Gärdenfors,et al.  Decision, Probability, and Utility : Selected Readings , 1988 .

[2]  Wlodek Rabinowicz.  Stable and Retrievable Options , 1989, Philosophia Scientiæ.

[3]  Joseph Y. Halpern.  Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning , 1998, Int. J. Game Theory.

[4]  Robert Stalnaker.  Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games , 1996, Economics and Philosophy.

[5]  Robert Stalnaker.  On the evaluation of solution concepts , 1994 .

[6]  Wlodek Rabinowicz.  To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-utility Violations , 1995 .

[7]  Philip J. Reny.  Knowledge, belief, and strategic interaction: Common knowledge and games with perfect information , 1988 .

[8]  Paul Weirich.  Equilibrium and rationality , 1998 .

[9]  Wlodek Rabinowicz.  Ratificationism without ratification: Jeffrey meets Savage , 1985 .

[10]  R. Selten.  Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games , 1975, Classics in Game Theory.

[11]  Dov Samet,et al.  Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information , 1996 .

[12]  Cristina Bicchieri,et al.  Backward Induction without Common Knowledge , 1988, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.

[13]  R. Aumann.  Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality , 1995 .

[14]  Philip Pettit,et al.  The backward induction paradox , 1989 .

[15]  J. Sobel.  Backward-Induction Arguments: A Paradox Regained , 1993, Philosophy of Science.

[16]  Ken Binmore,et al.  Modeling Rational Players: Part II , 1987, Economics and Philosophy.