Resistance to Bribery when Aggregating Soft Constraints (Extended Abstract)

We investigate a multi-agent scenario where agents express their preferences over a large set of decisions via soft constraints. We consider sequential procedures (based on Plurality, Approval, and Borda) to aggregate agents’ preferences and we study their resistance to bribery attempts to influence the result of the aggregation.

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