Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity

This paper shows that the presence of large public pension fund shareholders particularly reduces acquisitions by cash-rich and low-q firms, and by firms seeking to ``buy growth'', after controlling for ownership endogeneity, firm-level governance structure, and other firm characteristics. When firms with large public pension fund presence do acquire other firms, they perform relatively better in the long-run. Other institutional investors have either the opposite effect or no effect.

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