Modelling of Special Equipment Supervision Game Considering Risk Expectation

To reveal the causes of unlawful behaviours between special equipment quality supervision institutions and third-party special equipment inspection institutions, an evolutionary game model was developed. Since the expected payoff matrix frequently used in general game model cannot accurately describe the influence of the risk expectations, the prospect value function was proposed to build the revenue perception matrix of the model. Then, the evolutionary characteristics were analysed through replicator dynamics equations. Accordingly, the evolutionary stable strategies were obtained based on the Jacobian matrix. Moreover, the dynamic evolution phase diagrams were formulated to describe the behaviours. Finally, numerical simulation examples were conducted to investigate the evolutionary path and the evolutionarily stable strategies. Results show that the probability of the third-party special equipment inspection institution choosing the passive performance strategy is negatively correlated with the expected risk value. The supervision probability of the quality supervision institution is directly proportional to the social benefits. In addition, the supervision probability is dependent on the penalty risks, and the initial population scale. (Received in May 2017, accepted in October 2017. This paper was with the authors 2 months for 1 revision.)

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