论文信息 - Equitable choices in bargaining games with joint production

Equitable choices in bargaining games with joint production

Abstract In an experiment, we investigate two simple bargaining games with advance production: the ultimatum game and a symmetric demand game. After first choosing individual production levels, the two players determine how the“pie” is to be distributed. We determine several equity standards and propose a behavioral model which generates testable predictions. While game theory explains the observed decisions rather poorly, our behavioral model is supported by the data.

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