Sense and Direct Reference

Fregeans believe in senses. Direct reference theorists don’t. That’s why Fregeans can solve a number of familiar problemsabout cognitive value, propositional-attitude ascriptions, and empty namesthat direct reference theorists can’t. These problems provide reasons for resolving the dispute in favor of the Fregean theory. Or so the Fregeans say. Direct reference theorists reply that they, too, can solve the problems. So the problems don’t provide reasons for resolving the dispute one way or the other. The direct reference reply is correct as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go far enough. What has been missed is why direct reference theorists can solve the problems. The reason is simple: direct reference theorists can also appeal to senses. This is the sort of thing that is blindingly obviousonce you notice it. People have no doubt been muttering about it quietly to themselves for some time. But it needs to be articulated more clearly, in part because of its consequences. In particular, it turns out that we need to rethink the dispute between Fregeans and direct reference theorists before we can resolve it. Properly understood, the dispute isn’t about whether there are senses so much as it is about where there are senses.