The Strategic LQG System: A Dynamic Stochastic VCG Framework for Optimal Coordination

The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., that truth-telling of all agents is a dominant strategy, for a static one-shot game. However, in a dynamic environment that unfolds over time, the agents' intertemporal payoffs depend on the expected future controls and payments, and a direct extension of the VCG mechanism is not sufficient to guarantee incentive compatibility. In fact, it does not appear to be feasible to construct mechanisms that ensure the dominance of dynamic truth-telling for agents comprised of general stochastic dynamic systems. The contribution of this paper is to show that such a dynamic stochastic extension does exist for the special case of Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) agents with a careful construction of a sequence of layered payments over time. We propose a layered version of a modified VCG mechanism for payments that decouples the intertemporal effect of current bids on future payoffs, and prove that truth-telling of dynamic states forms a dominant strategy if system parameters are known and agents are rational. An important example of a problem needing such optimal dynamic coordination of stochastic agents arises in power systems where an Independent System Operator (ISO) has to ensure balance of generation and consumption at all time instants, while ensuring social optimality (maximization of the sum of the utilities of all agents). Addressing strategic behavior is critical as the price-taking assumption on market participants may not hold in an electricity market. Agents, can lie or otherwise game the bidding system. The challenge is to determine a bidding scheme between all agents and the ISO that maximizes social welfare, while taking into account the stochastic dynamic models of agents, since renewable energy resources such as solar/wind are stochastic and dynamic in nature, as are consumptions by loads which are influenced by factors such as local temperatures and thermal inertias of facilities.

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