Static Analysis of Routing Protocols for Ad-Hoc Networks

An ad-hoc network is a collection of wireless nodes which adhere to a communication principle without fixed infrastructure or a centralised control component. Instead, nodes have to rely on each other in order to forward packages to others beyond direct transmission range. Developing reliable routing protocols for these networks is a hard task, especially when studied in an untrusted environment. But new protocols are predominantly validated by an interpretation of simulation results, thus lacking a rigid formal analysis necessary for ensuring security. We present a step in the direction of formal protocol verification in this setting by proposing a quantitative extension to the process calculus CBS that allows us to model the behaviour of ad-hoc networks. We apply our development to the DSR routing protocol and develop a static analysis defined by a flow logic in order to track the messages sent in a network. The analysis is then used to evaluate the sensitivity of the network to the presence of an attacker trying to disrupt communication.