Uncertainty, Cooperation, and Crime: Understanding the Decision to Co-offend

A substantial body of research suggests that, in spite of the risks associated with co-offending, offenders frequently choose to work together. Dominant theories of crime, as well as those of decision making in general (e.g., game theory), typically assume that people's choices are based on instrumentally rational calculations; however, research on decision making highlights the limitations of this assumption for understanding decisions to cooperate in both noncriminal and criminal activities. We draw on work on social dilemma theories, as well as James Coleman's treatise on collective action (1990), for other insights into the motivation to cooperate. We extend these ideas and argue that the challenges of everyday adversity and contacts with potential co-offenders may increase people's willingness to trust others and co-offend. Employing data from a two-wave panel of street youth in Toronto and Vancouver, we test these ideas in multivariate models of street theft. We find that of the various cooperative styles examined, a form we call collaboration is most important in facilitating crime. Given the uncertainties associated with cooperation in criminal endeavors, how might we best explain an individual's decision to co-offend? In any cooperative activity there is always some possibility that, after receiving the benefits of a person's actions, potential cooperators may not reciprocate.' This uncertainty makes people vulnerable to their cooperator's whims, hidden agendas, or