Auctions and Pricing in E-Marketplaces

By offering high-speed communication and tight connectivity, advances in information technology have opened new venues for companies to create flexible supply chains. Today, many companies, from the electronics, pharmaceutical, to the automotive industry, are focusing on their core competencies and outsourcing significant portions of their business operations. As supply chains become more decentralized upstream, the pricing of intermediate goods is no longer a formality used between departments — but rather the key to a company’s survival. Strangely enough, while companies have spent millions of dollars to help them reduce their operating costs, the majority continue to use crude techniques in deciding what price to charge for their products Anthes, 1999.

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