The Benefits of Bureaucracy: Public Managers' Perceptions of Political Support, Goal Ambiguity, and Organizational Effectiveness

Public organizations rely extensively on sources of support - political and otherwise - external to themselves to ensure continued success in meeting policy goals. The resource-dependent nature of political-administrative relations can create performance problems for organizations, especially when perceptions of political support decline. Previous literature demonstrates how low levels of political support may amplify goal ambiguity for organizations in the public sphere. We argue that these organizations benefit from hierarchical authority, which can diffuse environmental uncertainties (such as those associated with increased goal ambiguity) to maintain performance. We develop a test of this claim using data collected in Phase II of the National Administrative Studies Project. Findings confirm a contingent model of performance in which low political support and increased goal ambiguity are counteracted by varying degrees of internal hierarchical authority.

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