Public borrowing in harsh times: The League of Nations Loans revisited

This paper reassesses the importance of the League of Nations loans of the 1920s. These long-term loans were an essential part of the League’s strategy to restore the productive basis of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Whereas the literature is not conclusive as to the final result of this experience, we argue that the League Loans were successful because they accomplished the task for which they were conceived—namely, to allow countries in financial distress to access capital markets. This success rested on the sustained efforts of the League of Nations to gather support from creditor countries’ governments and financial intermediaries, as well as its efforts to develop plans for economic reform for borrowing countries. We provide quantitative and qualitative evidence to show that the League provided market access in a difficult and hostile environment, and did so by building its own reputation as an actor that provided a credible commitment to economic and institutional reforms. Through the success of the placement of the initial issues, the League became capable of influencing borrowing costs, even if they continued to be predominately determined by the secondary market and remained high as a result of the risk involved. Much of the confusion in the literature is explained by the fact that the League lacked its own capital, which impeded its ability to act as a lender of last resort once the great depression hit Europe.

[1]  L. Ureche-Rangau,et al.  Interwar Romanian sovereign bonds: the impact of diplomacy, politics and the economy1 , 2012, Financial History Review.

[2]  I. Racianu La Roumanie face aux rivalités politiques et financières internationales, 1922-1935 , 2012 .

[3]  Juan H. Flores Information asymmetries and conflict of interest during the Baring crisis, 1880–18901 , 2011, Financial History Review.

[4]  Mark C. Weidemaier Contracting for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign Debt Arbitration , 2011 .

[5]  A. Ritschl,et al.  The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe: Business cycles and economic policy, 1914–1945 , 2010 .

[6]  Marc Flandreau,et al.  Conflicts of Interest, Reputation, and the Interwar Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck? , 2010 .

[7]  Marc Flandreau,et al.  Bonds and Brands: Foundations of Sovereign Debt Markets, 1820-1830 , 2008 .

[8]  P. Clavin,et al.  Transnationalism and the League of Nations: Understanding the Work of Its Economic and Financial Organisation , 2005, Contemporary European History.

[9]  P. Clavin,et al.  Another Golden Idol? The League of Nations' Gold Delegation and the Great Depression, 1929–1932 , 2004 .

[10]  L. Pauly International Financial History in the Twentieth Century: International Financial Institutions and National Economic Governance: Aspects of the New Adjustment Agenda in Historical Perspective , 2003 .

[11]  J. Tirole Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System , 2002 .

[12]  W. H. Wynne,et al.  State Insolvency And Foreign Bondholders , 2000 .

[13]  M. Horn A Private Bank at War: J.P. Morgan & Co. and France, 1914–1918 , 2000 .

[14]  L. Pauly Who Elected the Bankers?: Surveillance and Control in the World Economy , 1997 .

[15]  L. Pauly The League of Nations and the Foreshadowing of the International Monetary Fund , 1996 .

[16]  N. Ferguson Keynes and the German Inflation , 1995 .

[17]  M. Mouton La Société des Nations et les intérêts de la France (1920-1924) , 1995 .

[18]  Julio A. Santaella Stabilization Programs and External EnforcementExperience from the 1920s , 1993 .

[19]  Barry Eichengreen,et al.  Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 , 1992 .

[20]  R. Roberts Schroders: Merchants & Bankers , 1992 .

[21]  Anne Orde British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World War , 1990 .

[22]  P. Ziegler The Sixth Great Power: Barings 1762-1929 , 1988 .

[23]  C. Kindleberger A Financial History of Western Europe , 1985 .

[24]  Denise Artaud La question des dettes interalliees et la reconstruction de l'Europe (1917-1929) , 1983 .

[25]  Neal Pease Poland, the United States, and the Stabilization of Europe, 1919-1933 , 1986 .

[26]  Dan P. Silverman Reconstructing Europe after the Great War , 1982 .

[27]  P. Wandycz The United States and Poland , 1980 .

[28]  K. Burk The Diplomacy of Finance: British Financial Missions to The United States 1914–1918 , 1979, The Historical Journal.

[29]  Broadus Mitchell,et al.  European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970. , 1976 .

[30]  R. Bear,et al.  Unseasoned Equity Financing , 1975, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.

[31]  R. Meyer Bankers' diplomacy : monetary stabilization in the twenties , 1970 .

[32]  Nicole. Peitri La Société des Nations et la reconstruction financière de l'Autriche, 1921-1926 , 1970 .

[33]  P. Abrahams American Bankers and the Economic Tactics of Peace: 1919 , 1969 .

[34]  F. Reilly,et al.  Investor Experience with New Stock Issues , 1969 .

[35]  A. Salter Memoirs of a public servant , 1961 .

[36]  L. Chandler Benjamin Strong: Central Banker , 1959 .

[37]  H. Arndt The League of Nations Reconstruction Schemes in the Inter-War Period , 1946 .

[38]  M. Hill The economic and financial organization of the League of Nations : a survey of twenty-five years' experience , 1946 .

[39]  M. G. Myers The League Loans , 1945 .