From Ought to Is: Moral Norms in Large-Scale Social Dilemmas

Von Borgstede, C., Dahlstrand, U., & Biel, A. From ought to is: Moral norms in large-scale social dilemmas. Göteborg Psychological Reports, 1999, 29, No. 5. This study examined the role of social norms in enhancing co-operation in large-scale social dilemmas. One survey and two experiments were conducted. In the survey, respondents were asked to estimate how they ought to act and their behavioural intention in each of five social dilemmas. In the first experiment, norm strength varied according to the percentage of similar others who thought one ought to co-operate. In the second experiment, norm strength was manipulated through how many similar others that had co-operated in the past in each situation. In both experiments, subjects rated their behavioural intention to co-operate. The results supported the role of norm strength. In the survey, for each situation there was a positive correlation between estimated norm strength and behavioural intention. In both experiments, there was a significant effect of norm strength on behavioural intention.

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