Resilient infrastructure for network security

Present-day network security mechanisms are based on preventing attacks and responding to them as they occur. In the time before a response is implemented the attack is generally free to damage the system. Because responses are usually human driven, this time is long and the damage can be large. One way to minimize this damage is to create "resilient infrastructure." This is infrastructure that automatically slows attacks, so buying time for a human response. This article argues the case for resilient infrastructure in network security.

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