论文信息 - Controlling malevolent behavior in open multi-agent systems by means of deterrence theory

Controlling malevolent behavior in open multi-agent systems by means of deterrence theory

Heterogeneous agents with common goals may compete with each other by means of benevolent or malevolent actions. Deterrence theory, which is widely studied in economics and public policy, is introduced as the basis of our analysis. Some preventive schemes are discussed. At last, we conduct simulations to show the strength and weaknesses of various policies.

Pinata Winoto

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