Hostile Blockchain Takeovers (Short Paper)

Most research modelling Bitcoin-style decentralised consensus protocols has assumed profit-motivated participants. Complementary to this analysis, we revisit the notion of attackers with an extrinsic motivation to disrupt the consensus process (Goldfinger attacks). We outline several routes for obtaining a majority of decision-making power in the consensus protocol (a hostile takeover). Our analysis suggests several fundamental differences between proof-of-work and proof-of-stake systems in the face of such an adversary.

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