Justifiable Group Choice

We study the judgment aggregation problem from the perspective of justifying a particular collective decision by a corresponding aggregation on the criteria. In particular, we characterize the logical relations between the decision and the criteria that enable justification of a majority decision through a proposition-wise aggregation rule with no veto power on the criteria. While the well-studied "doctrinal paradox" provides a negative example in which no such justification exists, we show that genuine possibility results emerge if there is a gap between the necessary and the sufficient conditions for the decision. This happens, for instance, if there is only a partial consensus about the appropriate criteria for the decision, if only a subset of these criteria can be elicited, or if the judgment on criteria is based on probabilistic acceptance thresholds.

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