Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design

We characterize ex post incentive compatible public decision rules, and apply this characterization to (i) bilateral trade and (ii) public good provision.

[1]  P. Reny,et al.  Correlated Information and Mechanism Design , 1992 .

[2]  Dilip Mookherjee,et al.  Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian incentive Compatible Allocation Rules , 1992 .

[3]  Benny Moldovanu,et al.  Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade , 1999, J. Econ. Theory.

[4]  Vijay Krishna,et al.  Efficient Mechanism Design , 1998 .

[5]  Steven R. Williams.  A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms , 1999 .

[6]  B. Moldovanu,et al.  Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations , 2001 .

[7]  E. Maskin,et al.  Quarterly Journal of Economics Efficient Auctions* Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin , 2000 .

[8]  Richard P. McLean,et al.  FULL EXTRACTION OF THE SURPLUS IN BAYESIAN AND DOMINANT STRATEGY AUCTIONS , 1988 .

[9]  M. Satterthwaite,et al.  Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .

[10]  Richard P. McLean,et al.  Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent , 1985 .

[11]  D. Bergemann,et al.  Robust Mechanism Design , 2003 .

[12]  Vijay Krishna.  Asymmetric English auctions , 2003, J. Econ. Theory.

[13]  Dirk Bergemann,et al.  Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design , 2000 .

[14]  P. Reny,et al.  AN EFFICIENT AUCTION , 2002 .

[15]  V. Krishna,et al.  Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design , 2001 .

[16]  E. Maskin,et al.  Auctions and Privatization , 1992 .

[17]  C. d'Aspremont,et al.  Incentives and incomplete information , 1979 .