论文信息 - Large games with countable characteristics

Large games with countable characteristics

Abstract We consider anonymous games with an atomless probability space of players in which players’ characteristics are countable. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies together with the function assigning characteristics to players. This result implies the existence of Nash equilibria in continuous large games with countable characteristics.

Guilherme Carmona | Guilherme Carmona

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