A model for asynchronous reactive systems and its application to secure message transmission

We present a rigorous model for secure reactive systems in asynchronous networks with a sound cryptographic semantics, supporting abstract specifications and the composition of secure systems. This enables modular proofs of security, which is essential in bridging the gap between the rigorous proof techniques of cryptography and tool-supported formal proof techniques. The model follows the general simulatability approach of modern cryptography. A variety of network structures and trust models can be described such as static and adaptive adversaries, some examples of this are given. As an example of our specification methodology we provide an abstract and complete specification for Secure Message Transmission, improving on recent results by Lynch (1999), and verify one concrete implementation. Our proof is based on a general theorem on the security of encryption in a reactive multi-user setting, generalizing a recent result by Bellare et. al (2000).

[1]  Martín Abadi,et al.  Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)* , 2001, Journal of Cryptology.

[2]  Ran Canetti.  A unified framework for analyzing security of protocols , 2001, Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex..

[3]  Nancy A. Lynch,et al.  Probabilistic Simulations for Probabilistic Processes , 1994, Nord. J. Comput..

[4]  Birgit Pfitzmann,et al.  A General Framework for Formal Notions of "Secure" Systems , 1994 .

[5]  Birgit Pfitzmann,et al.  Secure Reactive Systems , 2000 .

[6]  Silvio Micali,et al.  Probabilistic Encryption , 1984, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..

[7]  Mihir Bellare,et al.  Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes , 1998, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[8]  Andrew Chi-Chih Yao,et al.  Protocols for secure computations , 1982, FOCS 1982.

[9]  Donald Beaver,et al.  Cryptographic Protocols Provably Secure Against Dynamic Adversaries , 1992, EUROCRYPT.

[10]  Birgit Pfitzmann,et al.  Cryptographic Security of Reactive Systems Extended Abstract , 2000 .

[11]  Ran Canetti,et al.  Security and Composition of Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols , 2000, Journal of Cryptology.

[12]  Hugo Krawczyk,et al.  A modular approach to the design and analysis of authentication and key exchange protocols (extended abstract) , 1998, STOC '98.

[13]  Danny Dolev,et al.  On the security of public key protocols , 1981, 22nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1981).

[14]  Seif Haridi,et al.  Distributed Algorithms , 1992, Lecture Notes in Computer Science.

[15]  Silvio Micali,et al.  Verifiable Secret Sharing as Secure Computation , 1994, EUROCRYPT.

[16]  Oded Goldreich,et al.  Foundations of Cryptography (Fragments of a Book) , 1995 .

[17]  Birgit Pfitzmann,et al.  Provably Secure Certified Mail , 2000 .

[18]  Daniel R. Simon,et al.  Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack , 1991, CRYPTO.

[19]  P ? ? ? ? ? ? ? % ? ? ? ? , 1991 .

[20]  Andrew Chi-Chih Yao,et al.  Theory and application of trapdoor functions , 1982, 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1982).

[21]  Silvio Micali,et al.  A Digital Signature Scheme Secure Against Adaptive Chosen-Message Attacks , 1988, SIAM J. Comput..

[22]  John C. Mitchell,et al.  Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Equivalence and Security Analysis , 1999, World Congress on Formal Methods.

[23]  Ueli Maurer,et al.  Player Simulation and General Adversary Structures in Perfect Multiparty Computation , 2000, Journal of Cryptology.

[24]  Ran Canetti,et al.  Studies in secure multiparty computation and applications , 1995 .

[25]  Nancy A. Lynch,et al.  I/O automaton models and proofs for shared-key communication systems , 1999, Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop.

[26]  John C. Mitchell,et al.  A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis , 1998, CCS '98.

[27]  Birgit Pfitzmann,et al.  Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems , 2000, CCS.

[28]  Leonid A. Levin,et al.  Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority , 1990, CRYPTO.

[29]  Silvio Micali,et al.  Public-Key Encryption in a Multi-user Setting: Security Proofs and Improvements , 2000, EUROCRYPT.

[30]  Silvio Micali,et al.  The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems , 1985, STOC '85.

[31]  Ran Canetti,et al.  An Efficient Threshold Public Key Cryptosystem Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack , 1999, EUROCRYPT.