Virtual Criminality: Old Wine in New Bottles?

IT HAS become trite to suggest that the convergence of computing and communications has begun to change the way we live, and the way we commit crime. Whether this will necessitate a revision of our philosophical, historical and sociological assumptions, however, is another matter. One must beware of overgeneralization and hyperbole, which characterize a great deal of discourse on the digital age. In the pages that follow, I suggest that ‘virtual criminality’ is basically the same as the terrestrial crime with which we are familiar. To be sure, some of the manifestations are new. But a great deal of crime committed with or against computers differs only in terms of the medium. While the technology of implementation, and particularly its efficiency, may be without precedent, the crime is fundamentally familiar. It is less a question of something completely different than a recognizable crime committed in a completely different way. Perhaps the most remarkable developments relating to crime in the digital age are its transnational implications, and the threats to personal privacy posed by new technologies. The speed of electronic transactions allows an offender to inflict loss or damage on the other side of the world, bringing new meaning to the term ‘remote control’. In addition, digital technology facilitates surveillance, by public agencies and the private sector, to a degree that is quite revolutionary.