Spoofing the Limit Order Book: A Strategic Agent-Based Analysis
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Michael P. Wellman | Yevgeniy Vorobeychik | Xintong Wang | Christopher Hoang | Y. Vorobeychik | Xintong Wang | Christopher Hoang | Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
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