HAZOP Methodology Based on the Health, Safety, and Environment Engineering

In existing risk analysis techniques like the hazard and operability study (HAZOP) and the safety integrity level (SIL), design for operator safety is not considered. The health, safety, and environment (HSE) engineering depicts a detailed design directly related to the operator safety. However, the human risk had not been comprehensively analyzed. This paper proposes HSE-HAZOP as a technique for examining the systematic and efficient application of HSE engineering by exploiting the HAZOP systematic risk analysis technique and a quantitative risk derivation method, which is an advantage of the SIL. The analysis consists of four steps: the HSE-HAZOP preparation phase, risk analysis phase, risk assessment phase, and risk reduction phase. One part of a solution styrene butadiene rubber (SSBR) plant was used for a case study. In this case study, the items that handle with heptanoic acid were the study scope. After the risk assessment, we introduced the HSE engineering technique that should be applied for the risk reduction. Since there is no existing risk analysis method for HSE engineering, this proposed HSE-HAZOP is meaningful because it suggests systematic analysis method of the operator safety.

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