Study on the Long-term Incentive Mechanism of the Large-scale Dredging Project
暂无分享,去创建一个
Through the principal-agent theory and game theory, this article has established the long-term income model of the large-scale dredging project, which has obtained the solution of the long-term incentive model, analyzed the impact of the dynamic consistency as well as pledge and negotiating cost to incomes of the principal and agent by means of increasing different constraint conditions. Furthermore, the study also shows that the long-term incentive model can provide the agent with stronger incentive.
[1] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES , 1987 .
[2] M. Aoki. Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy: A Microtheory of the Japanese Economy , 1988 .
[3] E. Lazear,et al. Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts , 1979, Journal of Political Economy.
[4] Study on Incentive Mechanism of Large-Scale Dredging Project Based on Fairness Preference , 2011 .