Stark - Tamperproof Authentication to Resist Keylogging

The weakest link in software-based full disk encryption is the authentication procedure today. Since the master boot record must be present unencrypted in order to launch the decryption of remaining system parts, it can easily be manipulated and infiltrated by bootkits that perform keystroke logging; consequently password-based authentication schemes become attackable. The current technological response, as enforced by BitLocker, ascertains the integrity of the boot process by use of the trusted platform module. But, as we show, this countermeasure is insufficient in

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