Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game

We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject , we observe a high degree of individuals’ punishment type stability . However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments.

[1]  Ananish Chaudhuri.  Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature , 2011 .

[2]  U. Fischbacher,et al.  Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms , 2002, Human nature.

[3]  M. Milinski,et al.  Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’ , 2002, Nature.

[4]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible , 1992, American Political Science Review.

[5]  Ernesto Reuben,et al.  Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations , 2009, Games Econ. Behav..

[6]  J. Huyck,et al.  Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure , 1990 .

[7]  Joyce E. Berg,et al.  Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History , 1995 .

[8]  Hawaii,et al.  Supporting Online Material Materials and Methods Figs. S1 to S6 Tables S1 and S2 Database S1 Antisocial Punishment across Societies , 2022 .

[9]  U. Fischbacher.  z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments , 1999 .

[10]  Toshio Yamagishi,et al.  The provision of a sanctioning system in the United States and Japan , 1988 .

[11]  F. Guala.  Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate , 2010, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[12]  Michael Kosfeld,et al.  Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management , 2010, Science.

[13]  David G. Rand,et al.  Humans Display a 'Cooperative Phenotype' that is Domain General and Temporally Stable , 2014 .

[14]  E. Fehr,et al.  Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments , 1999, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[15]  Sebastian Kube,et al.  The Interaction of Legal and Social Norm Enforcement , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[16]  Michael Kosfeld,et al.  Institution Formation in Public Goods Games , 2006 .

[17]  J. Brandts,et al.  A Change Would Do You Good... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations , 2006 .

[18]  L. Putterman,et al.  Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments , 2006 .

[19]  Andreas Nicklisch,et al.  hroot: Hamburg Registration and Organization Online Tool , 2014 .

[20]  Sebastian Kube,et al.  Cooperation and norm enforcement - The individual-level perspective , 2018, Journal of Public Economics.

[21]  Christian Thöni,et al.  Social Learning and Voluntary Cooperation Among Like-Minded People , 2004 .

[22]  Astrid Matthey,et al.  Efficiency and Punishment in a Coordination Game: Voluntary Sanctions in the Minimum Effort Game , 2015 .

[23]  Kenju Kamei.  Conditional Punishment in England , 2017 .

[24]  T. Yamagishi.  The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good , 1986 .

[25]  Andreas Blume,et al.  The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.

[26]  Urs Fischbacher,et al.  Learning and Peer Effects , 2008 .

[27]  Wolfgang J. Luhan,et al.  Cedex Discussion Paper Series , 2022 .

[28]  Ernst Fehr,et al.  Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions , 2005, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[29]  S. Cheung.  New insights into conditional cooperation and punishment from a strategy method experiment , 2014, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[30]  Jeffrey P. Carpenter,et al.  The Demand for Punishment , 2007 .

[31]  U. Fischbacher,et al.  Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment , 2001 .

[32]  N. Bardsley.  Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited , 2000 .