BITE: Bitcoin Lightweight Client Privacy using Trusted Execution
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Ghassan O. Karame | Srdjan Capkun | Ghassan Karame | Kari Kostiainen | Moritz Schneider | Karl Wüst | Sinisa Matetic | K. Wüst | Srdjan Capkun | Kari Kostiainen | Sinisa Matetic | Moritz Schneider
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