Cognitive Aids and Debiasing Methods: CAN Cognitive Pills Cure Cognitive Ills?

Abstract The purpose of the present chapter is to examine the effectiveness of cognitive aids in reducing and eliminating cognitive biases and errors of reasoning. Several classifications of cognitive aids are briefly discussed. In particular, it is proposed to distinguish between two general types of cognitive aids, procedural and structure modifying. Procedural aids are based on a specific prescription or algorithm, and do not require a deeper structural understanding. While such mechanical aids may often lead to performance improvement, their effect is limited to a particular task and cannot be generalized. In contrast, structure modifying aids require more effort and a change in the internal representation of the problem or task at hand. Such aids are more effective and permit generalizations beyond a particular task. The effectiveness of these two types of aids are further discussed in the context of improving the calibration of probabilistic assessments.

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