论文信息 - Heuristics for the deterministic bidding problem

Heuristics for the deterministic bidding problem

We study a suite of heuristics that were designed for bidding in the simultaneous auctions that characterize the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Travel Game. At a high-level, the design of many successful TAC agents can be summarized as: (i) predict: build a model of the auctions' clearing prices, and (ii) optimize: solve for an (approximately) optimal set of bids, given this model. We focus on the optimization piece of this design.

Victor Naroditskiy | Amy Greenwald

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