Ascending Proxy Auctions

Introduction Theoretical treatments of auctions usually analyze situations in which there is some particular item to be bought or sold and the question is what auction format to use. In real auctions, however, the important planning starts much earlier and is much more encompassing. For example, in a bankruptcy auction, the auctioneer may need to decide whether to sell a whole company as a single unit or its various assets individually, what guarantees to offer concerning the conditions of its physical assets, what kinds of financing terms to require, how much time to allow buyers to obtain needed regulatory or other approvals for the acquisition, and so on.

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