Collaborative Environmental Management: a Review of the literature

This paper reviews the game-theoretic literature on collaborative environmental management. It begins with a survey of static models of international environmental agreements (IEAs), comparing their underlying assumptions and their results. Extensions of the basic model to allow for both adaptation and mitigation, and for transfer payments are considered. We review the various concepts of coalitional stability, such as internal and external stability and far-sighted stability in the noncooperative strand, and the gamma core concept in the cooperative strand. The network approach to cooperation building is reviewed. We next survey extensions of IEA theory to dynamic models with stock pollutants, allowing membership status to change over time. Finally, dynamic cooperative games of pollution with transfer payments that take place over time are discussed.

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