Subjective confidence in forecasts: A response to fischhoff and MacGregor

ABSTRACT Here we evaluate the generalizability of calibration studies which have used general knowledge questions, and argue that on conceptual, methodological and empirical grounds the results have limited applicability to judgemental forecasting. We also review evidence which suggests that judgemental forecast probabilities are influenced by variables such as the desirability, imminence, time period and perceived controllability of the event to be forecast. As these variables do not apply to judgement in the domain of general knowledge, a need for research recognizing and exploring the psychological processes underlying uncertainty about the future is apparent. KEY WORDS Calibration Judgemental forecasting Subjective probability This paper reviews recent psychological research that has relevance for judgemental forecasting. Judgemental forecasts are often required in situations where actuarial, or relative frequency, data are unavailable or known to be unreliable. These judgements can be used as inputs to decision analysis and probabilistic information processing systems, which are based on subjective expected utility theory and Bayes’ theorem, respectively. (For a review of these decision aids see Wright (1984)). Economists have identified a need for judgemental forecasts when there is seen to be a possibility of ‘turning points’ in time series data. The recognition of the possibility of such turning points may be made on the basis of observing discontinuous changes in variables that are assumed to have a causal influence on the criterion variable. For example, consider the impact of the miners’ strike in the United Kingdom upon

[1]  Dan Zakay,et al.  The relationship between the probability assessor and the outcomes of an event as a determiner of subjective probability , 1983 .

[2]  W. Mcglothlin Stability of choices among uncertain alternatives. , 1956, The American journal of psychology.

[3]  B. Fischhoff,et al.  Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence. , 1977 .

[4]  E. Langer The Psychology Of Control , 1983 .

[5]  B. Fischhoff,et al.  Subjective Confidence in Forecasts. , 1982 .

[6]  Lawrence D. Phillips,et al.  Cultural differences in viewing uncertainty and assessing probabilities , 1977 .

[7]  Ayleen Wisudha,et al.  Distribution of probability assessments for almanac and future event questions , 1982 .

[8]  Wayne Snyder,et al.  Decision-Making with Risk and Uncertainty: The Case of Horse Racing , 1978 .

[9]  N. Weinstein Unrealistic optimism about future life events , 1980 .

[10]  S. Lichtenstein,et al.  Do those who know more also know more about how much they know?*1 , 1977 .

[11]  A. H. Murphy,et al.  subjective probability forecasting experiments in meteorology: some preliminary results , 1974 .

[12]  Lawrence D. Phillips,et al.  CULTURAL VARIATION IN PROBABILISTIC THINKING: ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY* , 1980 .

[13]  B. Fischhoff,et al.  Calibration of probabilities: the state of the art to 1980 , 1982 .

[14]  M. A. Milburn,et al.  Sources of bias in the prediction of future events , 1978 .

[15]  William C. Howell,et al.  A test of task influences in uncertainty measurement , 1982 .

[16]  Elizabeth C. Hirschman,et al.  Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , 1974, Science.

[17]  George Wright,et al.  Changes in the realism and distribution of probability assessments as a function of question type , 1982 .

[18]  W. C. Howell,et al.  Uncertainty measurement: A cognitive taxonomy , 1978 .

[19]  D. J. White,et al.  Decision Theory , 2018, Behavioral Finance for Private Banking.

[20]  A. Tversky,et al.  Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , 1974, Science.