Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions

This book provides a comprehensive description of mechanism design theory and its application to solving current game theoretic problems in computer science, communication networks and networked systems. Part I, presents the foundations of mechanism design in a rigorous way & provides a comprehensive discussion of key results in mechanism design theory. Part II discusses 3 significant applications of mechanism design. Part III provides an overview of the current state-of-the-art in mechanism design & succinctly describes many emerging applications within intelligent networked systems. It also includes an appendix containing illustrative examples, essential aspects of non-cooperative game theory required for understanding mechanism design. Topics include: strategic form games, dominant stratefy equilibria, Nash equilibria & Bayesian games. With its balanced blend of theory & compelling applications, this text offers a single window research reference for graduate students, & academic & industry researchers.

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