Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy †

Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic under standing of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge inter national agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement. (JEL Q54, Q58, K32, K33)

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