Trust and the Consumption of a Deteriorating Common Resource

This study examines the relationship between generalized expectations about others' behavior (interpersonal trust) and consumption of a regenerating resource in a simulated commons dilemma. Eighty subjects were assigned to one of four feedback conditions in a split-plot factorial design (trust X feedback X blocks). Resources were programmed to deteriorate at four different rates. However, subjects believed they were acting in groups of five, and that resource deterioration was a consequence of the rate of consumption of the resource. When faced with minimal deterioration of the resource pool, subjects increased their consumption over trial blocks; rapid deterioration led to decreased consumption. However, the consumption rate of low trusters was unaffected by the rate at which the resource deteriorated. High trusters consumed more than low trusters when resource deterioration was minimal, but significantly less than low trusters under conditions of rapid deterioration. The results give support to the claim that trust plays an important role in mediating resource consumption in commons dilemmas.

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